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This paper shows how including divisibility of goods and produc-
tive heterogeneity leads to the emergence of middlemen in an equi-
librium search environment. In the baseline model, middlemen are
welfare reducing and their number increases as market frictions are
reduced. When the model is extended to allow for time taken in pro-
duction and increasing returns-to-scale in the market meeting tech-
nology, middlemen can be beneﬁcial to society by speeding up the
meeting process.
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11 Introduction
This paper provides a simple modiﬁcation of Diamond’s [1982] (coconut)
search model to investigate the emergence of middlemen in markets charac-
terized by matching frictions. Individuals in the model are not born with, nor
are they able to acquire, any special skills that might enhance their ability
to act as a market intermediary. Still, the ﬁn d i n gi st h a ta sl o n ga sg o o d s
are divisible, and there is suﬃcient heterogeneity in productive ability, some
people will become middlemen simply to avoid the cost of producing. More-
over, in the baseline model intermediation is detrimental to society in that a
ban on such activities would improve economic eﬃciency.
In the baseline model, individuals cycle between trading and production
which occur in separate locations. Trading is driven by the unpalatability of
one’s own output and takes place in an anonymous market with matching
frictions. Production is instantaneous but costly. To become a middleman an
individual simply has to forego consumption once, and remain in the market.
Holding an edible good strengthens a middleman’s bargaining position with
future trading partners - he acquires a trading partner’s whole good for part
of the one he is carrying. He consumes the remainder of the divided good
and leaves with the partner’s good intact; ready to trade again. Middlemen,
therefore, survive by ‘buying low’ and ‘selling high’. They never need to
produce, so intermediation is more attractive to those with higher production
costs.
In this environment, middlemen simply clog up the system. They have
no eﬀect on the frequency of trading opportunities but when they are around
some trades only involve the consumption of one unit of output rather than
two. Producers (non-middleman traders) do business with middlemen to
2avoid the time cost of looking for another producer (from whom they would
get a whole good). Output is necessarily lower when individuals are permit-
ted to act as middlemen than when they are banned from the practice. As
the production cost they avoid is less than the utility received from consump-
tion, a laissez-faire economy with middlemen is necessarily ineﬃcient. The
source of ineﬃciency is an entry/exit type externality (see Hosios [1990]); in
their decision to become middlemen, individuals do not take account of the
eﬀect of their choice on future trading partners.
This paper goes on to consider an extension of the model in which pro-
duction takes time. In this environment, a snap shot of the economy ﬁnds
some proportion of the population involved in production. As middlemen
remain in the market there are more potential trading opportunities when
they are around than when they are forced to produce. How this aﬀects the
social contribution of intermediation depends on how the aggregate number
of meetings changes with the number of people in the market. It is com-
mon in the labor literature, for instance (see Pissarides [2000]), to assume
constant returns to scale in the meeting technology. In the current context
this would mean individual meeting rates are unaﬀected by the number of
people in the market. So, with constant returns to scale, middlemen do not
improve the trading opportunities of those who do produce. Only if individ-
ual meeting rates increase with the population of people in the market does
the presence of middlemen act to reduce the time producers take to trade. It
will be shown then, that if the meeting technology exhibits suﬃciently strong
increasing returns to scale, laissez-faire equilibrium with middlemen can be
preferred to the allocation that results from a ban on such intermediation. In
this context, the individual incentives to become a middleman are the same
as in the baseline model. The increasing returns in the meeting technology
3simply redirects the eﬀect of the entry/exit externality.
The literature on the role of intermediaries in matching environments
with search frictions started with Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1987]. Their
model has 3 types of agents: buyers, sellers and middlemen. While buyers
and sellers are free to trade with each other, middlemen are able to match
more quickly which gives them a natural advantage in the market. Buyers
and sellers simply ﬂow through the market while middlemen remain there.
The terms of trade faced by each type of agent are determined endogenously
by Nash bargaining. They show that equilibria in which middlemen make
positiveproﬁts are possible. While they show that the existence of middlemen
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the welfare of buyers and sellers, the proﬁts of
middlemen are necessarily ignored in these calculations. This is because the
middlemen are inﬁnite lived and the others survive only as long as it takes
them to trade. The current paper avoids such non-comparability because the
middlemen emerge from the same population as the buyers and sellers.
The work on middlemen subsequent to Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1987]
falls into two strands. One strand has introduced private information over
the quality of goods. If buyers cannot tell lemons from peaches, producers
face a moral hazard problem. Biglaiser [1993] shows that there is a role for
middlemen when the technology for quality assessment has increasing returns
to scale. Li [1996] studies a similar problem in a general equilibrium setting.
She shows that some people will become middlemen through the costly ac-
quisition of skills which allow them to identify product quality. Buyers will
pay more for goods bought from the middleman because they believe such
g o o d st ob eo fh i g h e rq u a l i t y .
The other strand of the literature has enriched the basic Rubinstein and
Wolinsky [1987] model through the introduction of heterogeneous goods and
4idiosyncratic preferences (see Shevchenko [2001], Johri and Leach [2000] and
Smith [2002]). These are essentially models of shopping. In the presence
search frictions it behooves some portion of the population to hold multiple
inventories of heterogeneous goods so that the probability of gains from trade
at any match is increased.
The current paper focusses on an additional incentive for people to be-
come intermediaries, that of avoiding production costs. As such, the paper
does not provide a model of any particular market. The assertion is rather
that all of the roles of middlemen identiﬁed in the literature along with that
put forward here are simultaneously active in real-world markets. The rela-
tive importance of each, however, might vary across sectors.1
Another literature to which this paper bares comparison is that on micro
models of money. In a general sense, money can be deﬁned as anything that is
worth more in exchange than in consumption. Being intrinsically worthless,
ﬁat money clearly ﬁts this description. An item that has non-negligible
value in consumption (for at least some of the population), and is used in
exchange is called a commodity money. In the literature on the foundations of
monetary economics (e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright [1989]), commodity moneys
have typically been of this type. That is, goods have diﬀerent values to
diﬀerent people and they are used as money by those who do not value them
in consumption. An exception to this rule has been Burdett et al [2001] who
show that a general good (from which everyone can derive utility) might be
used as money in order to increase the chances of acquiring a more desired
specialist good. In this paper, it is shown that goods can be used as money
1Ollivier [2000] had diﬀerent groups of people rank occupations and found that real-
estate agents were consistently placed low in terms of prestige and perceived usefulness to
society relative to other occupations requiring similar levels of education.
5even if they are as desirable in consumption to the carrier as the good to be
acquired with it. The reason the holder does not eat his inventory is that it
improves his bargaining position at subsequent trading opportunities.
2M o d e l
2.1 Baseline Environment
The economy comprises a continuum of risk neutral individuals who live for
ever. The population is normalized to 1. They exist in continuous time and
they discount the future at a common rate r.
Following Diamond [1982], to provide a motive for trade, individuals get
no utility from the consumption of their own output but get u per unit of
anyone else’s output consumed.2 Trade occurs in a decentralized anonymous
market characterized by random matching. Any participant meets another
with Poisson arrival rate β.3 Only whole goods can be brought to market
and individuals can only carry one good at a time. Goods can, however, be
divided for the purpose of consumption but any part of the good not eaten
immediately rots (coconuts continue to be a good example).
There is ex ante heterogeneity with respect to production costs. A type
c individual has production cost c ∼ F with support (0,¯ c]. Production costs
are observable. For the baseline environment, we assume that production
t a k e sn ot i m ea n d¯ c ≤ u. The model is extended to incorporate time-to-
produce in Section 4. To rule out long-term relationships, individuals have
2Discussion of an alternative preference arrangements is provided in Section 3.3.
3In this ﬁrst environment, either r or β i sr e d u n d a n t . B o t hh a v eb e e nk e p ti nf o r
expositional clarity and to ease comparison with the extended model of Section 4 where
they will have distinct roles.
6to leave the market to produce; only when they have a good in hand may
individuals re-enter by which point their connection with any previous trad-
ing partner is lost.4 Although there is no obligation to trade, only people
with inventory are permitted to remain in the market. Those that leave the
market must produce. This last assumption merely simpliﬁes the analysis
by preventing people from entering the production location and refusing to
produce - eﬀectively taking themselves out of the model. The implications
of relaxing this assumption will be explored in Section 3.2.
Apart from the heterogeneity and potential divisibility of the goods, the
basic environment is that of Diamond [1982] with immediate production and
ﬁxed production costs. The following subsection shows how divisibility of
goods generates a much richer set of potential trades than the one-for-one
swaps implied by indivisibility. It will be shown later that the heterogeneity
is needed in order for that set of trades to be realized in equilibrium.
2.2 Exchange
In any meeting between individuals the outcome is determined according
to Nash bargaining. A thorough treatment of Nash Bargaining is found in
Osborne and Rubinstein [1990]. Here, it suﬃces to point out that the implied














4There is a huge literature on matching to form long-term relationships, usually in
a labor market context (see Pissarides [2000]). This paper is focused on how trading
partners meet in the ﬁrst place. Restricting attention to one-time exchange of goods
allows abstraction from the complications caused by long-term relationships for steady
state ﬂows into and out of the market.
7where S is the set of utilities (s1,s 2) associated with every feasible and ex
post individually rational agreement between individuals 1 and 2.5 The Ti’s
are the utilities associated with disagreement for each individual i, also called
their ‘outside-options’. Feasibility requires that s1,s 2 ≥ 0 and s1+s2 cannot
exceed the maximum utility associated with either:
consumption of whatever goods are immediately available to the
participants plus their continuation values
or,
the combined value to disagreement, T1 + T2,
whichever is the larger.
We assume that (T1,T 2) ∈ S - they can agree to disagree. Individual ratio-
nality requires that for (s1,s 2) to be in S, si ≥ Ti,i=1 ,2.
Market equilibria, characterized below, are patterns of trade from which
no one wishes to deviate. To apply the Nash Bargaining Rule, (1), we ﬁxa n
equilibrium and consider its implications for the behavior of individuals in
any possible meeting.
(i) Producer-producer meetings
We will call a producer anyone who is regularly producing goods in order
to trade them and return to production. Whenever two producers meet,
the natural outcome is that they simply swap their goods. This is also the
Nash solution. To see this, notice that in any equilibrium S =[ V1,u− c1 +
V1] × [V2,u− c2 + V2] where the ci’s are their respective production costs
and the Vi’s represent the equilibrium value to being a producer of type ci.
The intuition for this result is that because individuals derive no value from
5Osborne and Rubinstein [1990] only impose feasibility on S.
8the consumption of their own output, utility is non-transferable. The Nash
axioms that underlie (1) include eﬃciency which precludes wastage.
(ii) Producer-middleman meetings
A middleman is anyone who, rather than eating it, holds onto a good
they did not produce. This makes sense only if the value to holding onto the
good exceeds that of consumption, production and returning to the market
with ones own good. That is, if
˜ Vi ≥ u − ci + Vi. (2)
where ˜ Vi represents the value to a type ci person of being a middleman.
Notice that as both parties derive utility from consuming the good brought
to the table by the middleman there is something to potentially negotiate
over. This can happen if the producer is prepared to hand over her whole
good for part of the one carried by the middleman. The analysis proceeds by
assuming this is true. We will then verify that this is indeed true as long as
condition (2) holds. Utility is now (locally) transferable and the Nash Bar-
gaining Rule (1) simply states that the participants divide the surplus (i.e.
the gains from trade) equally. Given the stationarity of the environment and
condition (2) any one who carries a good they did not produce prior to trade
will also prefer to hold on to any intact good they acquired through trade
(rather than eat it). The match surplus is therefore:
u − cj + Vj + ˜ Vi − Vj − ˜ Vi
= u − cj.
Veriﬁcation that under condition (2) the middleman will obtain at least the
producer’s good intact simply requires that u − cj > 0.
T h eu p s h o ti st h a ta sl o n ga sc o n d i tion (2) is true when a middleman
trades with a producer:
9• The producer consumes 1
2(u − cj)+cj utils worth of the middleman’s
good
• The middleman gets to walk oﬀ with the producers good and consume
1
2(u − cj) u t i l sw o r t ho ft h eg o o dh ew a sc a r r y i n g .
Of course, so far it has still not been established that condition (2) is ever
true. This will be addressed below.
(iii) Middleman-middleman meetings
Both people are holding goods they can eat, since trade could make nei-
ther better oﬀ, the match surplus is zero. There is no trade.
2.3 Market Equilibria
Equilibria are patterns of trading from which, in steady-state, no one wants to
deviate. Attention is restricted to steady-state equilibria so that the value to
being a producer or a middleman does not change over time. Consequently,
anyone choosing to be a middleman will be so for ever. To eliminate the
trivial equilibrium (where no one does anything) I assume that people have
been initially endowed with a unit of their production good. In a steady-
state, of course, any middleman would have long since traded that good for
one they can eat so that everyone who intended to be a middleman carries a
good produced by someone else. As middlemen do not produce, we will write
the value to being a middleman as Vm = ˜ Vi for all i. It is also convenient to
write the asset value to being a type c producer as V (c). So that Vi, in the
above notation would be replaced by V (ci). T h ec o n t i n u o u st i m ea s s e tv a l u e
equation for a producer of type c is then
rV(c)=αβ max{u − c,Vm − V (c)} +
1
2
(1 − α)β(u − c) (3)
10where α is the proportion of people in the market who are producers.6
The value of α is taken as given by the participants but will be endoge-
nously determined below. The ﬁrst term highlights the fact that each pro-
ducer has the option, after every meeting with another producer, of choosing
to become a middleman. The second term relates to possible meetings with
middlemen at which the type c producer gets half of the surplus, (u − c).
Given α, Vm ≥ 0, equation (3) implies that V (.) is strictly decreasing.
So, there exists a ˆ c<usuch that u−ˆ c = Vm−V (ˆ c) and all individuals with




αβE{c<ˆ c}(u − c) (4)
where E is the expectations operator. That is to say the middlemen get
half the match surplus from meetings with producers. They never produce
and meetings with other middlemen generate no trade.
Deﬁnition 1 A market equilibrium is a tuple {V (.),V m,ˆ c,α} that satisﬁes
equations (3) and (4), consistent with:
• optimal career choice: (u − ˆ c)=Vm − V (ˆ c).
6The simplicity of this expression is a consequence of the Poisson process for meetings.








αmax{u − c + V (c),V m} +( 1− α)
1
2
(u − c)+V (c)
¶
+(1 − β∆)V (c)] + o(∆)
where ∆ is a short time period and o(∆) represents the error in the equation due to the
possibility of two meetings within the time period ∆. By the assumptions of the Poisson
process, lim∆→0 o(∆)/∆ =0 . Equation (3) follows from taking the limit as ∆ approaches
0.
7For large values of Vm,u−ˆ c = Vm−V (ˆ c) implies ˆ c<0. In this case as (by assumption)
no individual has negative production costs we can impose that ˆ c =0 .
11• rational expectations: α = F(ˆ c).
In equilibrium, the critical value of the cost parameter above which people
optimally choose to be a middleman has to be consistent with the implied
probability with which individuals actually encounter with middlemen.




















(u − c) dF(c).
From these equations and the deﬁnition of ˆ c we get:
(u − ˆ c)[2r + β(1 + F(ˆ c)] = β
Z ˆ c
0
(u − c) dF(c)
Integration by parts yields,




This is similar to the “reservation price” equations from the search literature
(e.g. Mortensen [1985]) and is a characterization of equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique market equilibrium, ˆ c<u .
Proof. A direct implication of equation (6).
3A n a l y s i s a n d w e l f a r e
First, it should be clear that while ˆ c a l w a y se x i s t s ,i tn e e dn o tb et h ec a s et h a t
equilibrium always implies the existence of middlemen. For that we require






This means that when everyone is the same there are no middlemen.8 More-
over, ˆ c i st h el o w e s tv a l u eo fˆ c for any F. This is simply because any other
distribution of production costs necessarily ﬁrst-order-stochastically domi-
nates the degenerate distribution at 0. That is,
R c
0 G(ν)dν < c for any c>0
and any probability distribution function G deﬁn e do nt h es t r i c t l yp o s i t i v e
real line.
Straightforward diﬀerentiation reveals that ˆ c is increasing (decreasing)
in r (β). This means that as market frictions decrease, more people move
into intermediation. As the expected time until the next meeting falls (or
everyone gets more patient) the rate of return on a middleman’s inventory
increases. That is, for a given value of ˆ c, Vm−V (c) increases in proportion to
β but u−c which is always available to a type c middleman does not change.
Utilitarian welfare, W, is
W = αE{c|c<ˆ c}V (c)+( 1− α)Vm
When ˆ c ≥ ¯ c, there are no middlemen in equilibrium so





(u − c) dF(c) (8)
When ˆ c<¯ c from (5) we have

















8Notice that because we can always re-normalize u, setting the inﬁmum of the support







(u − c) dF(c). (9)
Welfare is simply the present value of ﬂow output less costs incurred in the
economy.
Comparing (8) and (9) reveals that middlemen contribute nothing to
society. Theirs is a parasitic existence, they simply clog up the system ex-
tracting rents from any producer they might meet. The net loss of welfare





(u − c) dF(c).
T h es o u r c eo ft h ei n e ﬃciency is that in their decision to become middlemen
individuals do not take account of the eﬀect of their choice on their future
trading partners.
Of course, to consider the implications of an eﬀective ban on being a
middleman we have to consider what happens along the transitional path.
Here the path is trivial; middlemen simply eat their inventory produce and
re-enter the market. The economy moves instantaneously to the new ‘no-
middleman steady-state’ adding another
Z ¯ c
ˆ c
(u − c) dF(c).
to total welfare.
In the absence of any compensatory transfer schemes, there are winners
a n dl o s e r sf r o mt h i sp o l i c y . L e tV n(c) represent the steady-state value to




14Those who were initially producers now consume a whole unit of output at
every meeting rather than having to share with middlemen. They each gain
β(1−F(ˆ c))(u−c)/2r. Middlemen, forced to abandon their trade, get to eat
their inventory but now have to produce to survive. They get (u − c)+
V n(c) − Vm. Since for the marginal middleman c =ˆ c,
V
n(ˆ c) − V (ˆ c)=β(1 − F(ˆ c))(u − ˆ c)/2r>0
Some ex-middlemen are, therefore, made better oﬀ. They choose to be mid-
dlemen in the laissez-faire economy because their returns from production
were reduced by the presence of other middlemen. While ˆ c<¯ c, ab a no n
middlemen would be binding for some individuals with values of c close to ¯ c,
or no one would have chosen to be a middleman in the ﬁrst place. However,
b e c a u s ee v e r y o n ei sm a d ew o r s eo ﬀ by the existence of other middlemen, it is
possible for the ban on intermediation to be Pareto improving. The following
example illustrates
3.1 Example
Half of the population is high productivity with c =0and half is low produc-
tivity with c =¯ c. The object is to consider what happens to the equilibrium
allocation and welfare at diﬀerent values of ¯ c.
As long as ¯ c<ˆ c, there are no middlemen and
ˆ c =
2(2r + β)u + β¯ c
2(r + β)
.
15When ¯ c =0 , ˆ c =ˆ c. As ¯ c increases so does ˆ c but to a lesser extent until9




It should be clear from inspection of (6) that in this case, further increases in
¯ c do not aﬀect ˆ c. Let W(¯ c) represent the (laissez-faire) equilibrium welfare
when the high cost people have production cost ¯ c and let Wn(¯ c) represent
the steady-state welfare under a ban on middleman activity. Then ,




(2u − ¯ c) (10)







(2u − ¯ c) (11)
When ¯ c>˜ c, (so all the high cost individuals are middlemen) the value to
being a producer is 3βu/4r. The value to being a middleman is βu/4r. Under
a ban on middlemen, the steady-state value to being a low cost person is βu/r.
T h eh i g hc o s tp e o p l eg e tβ (u − ¯ c)/r. If ¯ c>3u/4, t h eh i g hc o s tp e o p l ew i l l
prefer the laissez-faire allocation. But, for values of ¯ c in the range (˜ c,3u/4)
a ban on middlemen is a strict Pareto improvement.10
3.2 Voluntary production
Recall that so far, people who visit the production location must produce.
If instead production is voluntary, there is an extra decision to be made
(whether to produce or not). For any individual of type c, production is
9When F(.) contains mass points, as in this example, puriﬁable mixed strategy equi-
libria are possible. Here, if ¯ c =˜ c, there are a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria
associated with every proportion in [0,1] of the high cost individuals are middlemen.
10If ¯ c =˜ c, there are a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria which are Pareto rankable
according to the share of high cost individuals who choose to produce.
16worthwhile if V (c) >c .To see whether this requirement might preclude the










everyone who enters the production location will choose to produce. That is,
under restriction (12) equilibria when production is enforced are also equi-
libria when production is voluntary. The question now, is whether (12) rules
out those parameter conﬁgurations that would imply the emergence of inter-
mediaries.
From (6), ˆ c<¯ c if and only if
(2r + β)(u − ¯ c) − β
Z ¯ c
0
F(c)dc < 0 (13)
Now, pick any distribution, with ¯ c<ufor which (13) holds. As ¯ c is a
constant, it is always possible to pick a high enough value of β such that (12)
holds and since ˆ c decreases with β, (13) must also hold.
The upshot is that for the earlier analysis to go through, the extent of
discounting between meetings, r/β, has to be small enough. In the case








such values of ¯ c a r ep o s s i b l ea sl o n ga sr/β < 0.183.11
11By comparison, in a labor market context it is reasonable to use an annual discount
rate of 4% and a matching rate of one per month (see Blanchard and Diamond [1989]).
These ﬁgures imply r/β =0 .0033. More generally we expect market matching rates to be
much bigger then discount rates.
17While it may, be of interest to investigate what happens in this model
if some people refuse to produce, this goes beyond the scope of the current
paper.12
3.3 Alternative preference arrangement
A special feature of the model analyzed so far is that individuals get utility
from consuming everyone’s produce but their own. Here we brieﬂyc o n s i d e r
an alternative preference arrangement.
There are red and blue people, named after the color of their production
good. Red people only eat blue goods and vice-versa.T h e r ei st h es a m en u m -
ber of each color people and within each color there is the same distribution
of productive abilities. In this economy, suﬃciently unproductive individuals
will become middlemen. For example, a red middleman will trade her initial
inventory for a blue good. Rather than eat it, she looks for a red producer,
persuades that producer to hand over his whole good for part of the one she
is carrying. She then consumes the remainder of the blue good and goes oﬀ
with the red one. In this way, she avoids ever having to produce.
4 Time to produce
In the baseline model analyzed above, production has no opportunity cost
in terms of lost time in the market. This section of the paper extends the
model to incorporate time spent in production. The point here is to check the
robustness and eﬃciency of market equilibria with middlemen to this exten-
sion. In keeping with Diamond’s [1982] model, producers’ receive production
12A paper that does explore the implications of the choice between market and non-
market production in a micro model of money is Camera and Vesely [2004].
18opportunities according to a Poisson process; parameter γ. For ease of ex-
position however, the production cost is incurred on entry to the production
location. Again, to abstract from the complications caused by people refus-
ing to participate in the economy, individuals who arrive at the production
location must produce.13
As production takes time, steady-state ﬁnds a positive share of the pop-
ulation at the production location. This raises the issue of how the market
matching rate, β, depends on the number of people, N, in the market. It
is assumed that β = β(N) where β(.) is positive, continuously diﬀerentiable






=0 constant returns to scale (crs)
> 0 increasing returns to scale (irs)
A maintained component of the environment is ex ante heterogeneity with
attention restricted to continuous distributions in production costs.14 Again,
Nash bargaining implies a swap of goods when both parties to a meeting
are producers. Middlemen in this environment remain at all times in the
market. A prerequisite for being a middleman is that the asset value of that
activity, Vm, exceeds that of the alternative which is to consume and move to
the production location. When middlemen meet producers, Nash bargaining
implies a 50/50 split of the surplus by dividing the good brought by the
middleman. The constraint on the allocation implied by the fact that the
producer does not want to eat his own good will never bind.15 As before,
13It can be shown that the equilibria explored here are robust to voluntary production
over a positive proportion of the parameter space.
14Continuity of F(.) is imposed here to avoid mixed strategy equilibria and ease com-
parative static analysis.
15Nor does it aﬀect the agreed allocation - a consequence of Nash’s axiom of indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives.
19this is because no one would become a middleman in the ﬁrst place if she
cannot ensure that the agreements involve her walking oﬀ with the whole
good brought by the producer. Thus,








αβ(N)E{c|u−c+Vp(c)≥Vm} [u − c + Vp(c) − Vt(c)] (15)
rVp(c)=γ [Vt(c) − Vp(c)] (16)
where Vt(c) is the value to being a producer of type c in the market, Vp(c) is
the value to being a type c producer in the production location and α is the
proportion of people in the market who are producers. Following the proof
of Lemma 1, it is straightforward to show that if u−c+Vp(c) >V m,V t(.) is
continuous and everywhere decreasing. Consequently, from (16), given α,N
there exists a unique production cost, ˆ c such that





















Using this and suppressing arguments in Vp(.) and Vt(.) we have
















20In steady-state, the ﬂow of individuals into and out of the production
location have to be equal. That is
(1 − N)γ = αβ(N)N.
Middlemen represent 1 − F(ˆ c) of the total population. And, as they never
leave the market, they represent 1 − α share of the market population. So




β(N)(1− F(ˆ c)) + γ
.
Deﬁnition 3 A Steady-state Market Equilibrium in the extended model, is
ap a i r
n
ˆ c, ˆ N
o
, such that
(2r + β( ˆ N))
h
β( ˆ N)(1− F(ˆ c)) + γ
i





β(N)[ ˆ N − (1 − F(ˆ c))] = γ
h
1 − ˆ N
i
(18)
4.1 Constant Returns To Scale: β(N)=β for all N>0
Proposition 4 Market Equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proof. Under crs, the system (17), (18) is recursive. Lhs of (17) is de-
creasing in ˆ c on [0,u] achieving 0 at ˆ c = u. Rhs of (17) is increasing in ˆ c on
[0,u] a c h i e v i n g0a tˆ c =0 . Then
ˆ N =[ ( 1− F(ˆ c))β + γ]/(β + γ). (19)
21Straightforward comparative static analysis reveals that ˆ c increases with
r. Middlemen are more prominent in economies with more patient popula-
tions. Again this reﬂects the requirement for middlemen to forgo current
consumption in order to maintain their inventory. A consequence of this is
that a more patient population means that at any point in time, more people
are in the market (i.e. as r falls, ˆ N increases).
As the arrival rate of production opportunities, γ, increases, ˆ c falls. That
is, as the expected length of a spell in the production location decreases
more middlemen emerge. Shorter time to produce means that value to any
meeting in the market increases - there are more rents to be captured. As
γ can be viewed as a measure of technological progress, this result suggests
that more middlemen will emerge in those economies that are better able
to support them. From (19) the population in the market unambiguously
increases with γ. As γ approaches inﬁnity, the model reverts back to that
with instantaneous production.
Another form of technological progress in this model is reductions in the
production costs. As long as the fall in c is the same for everyone this is
equivalent to an increase in u which leads to an increase in ˆ c - a fall in the
number of middlemen and an increase in the market population, ˆ N.16 This
reﬂects the increase in the opportunity cost of being a middleman. While
a middleman’s return from any meeting rises with u, she only gets a part
of that increase. On the other hand, producers see the whole increase in u
whenever they trade with other producers. However, it is simple to show
that the change in ˆ c is less than the change in u.17 The increased number of
16Recall that setting the inﬁmum of the distribution of production costs to zero was a
normalization.
17That is to say, if the exercise were to actually to lower everyone’s production cost by
the same amount, rather than increase u, ˆ c would fall but by less than the amount that
22producers oﬀ-sets the relative disadvantage felt by middlemen. The diﬀerence
between this result and the previous one is that changes in γ aﬀect everyone
equally. Increases in u on the other hand, are more strongly felt by those
producers with higher values of c.
The introduction of positive spell lengths in the production location,
means that changes in β have ambiguous eﬀects on ˆ c. In particular, the sign of
t h ed e r i v a t i v eo fˆ c with respect to β is equal to the sign of
©
β
2(1 − F(ˆ c)) − 2rγ
ª
.
That is, ˆ c falls with β for low values of β (or high values of r,γ) and increases
with β when meeting is already very frequent. As β approaches both 0 and







ˆ c is in fact quasi-convex in β. That is, there is a unique value, ˆ β of the market
matching rate that minimizes ˆ c.S oˆ β
2
(1−F(ˆ c)) = 2rγ. As 1−F(ˆ c) is always
ﬁnite, in the limit as γ approaches inﬁnity, and production time goes to zero,
ˆ β approaches inﬁnity. This result is consistent with the monotone relation-
ship found between β and ˆ c in the model with instantaneous production.
When β is relatively low, trading partners are hard to come by and few
people are prepared to make the investment required to become a middleman;
increasing β means more middlemen because the cost of investment becomes
less severe. When the market meeting rate is already large, however, the
gains from trade for any ﬁnite γ become relatively small and any further
increase in β further diminishes the return to being a middleman.















production costs had been reduced by.








When production takes time, the transition from the steady-state with mid-
dlemen to the steady-state without middlemen is no longer trivial. As before,
a ban on intermediation means that all middlemen consume their inventory
and incur their production cost, but now the number of people in the mar-
ket takes time to reach its steady-state value. During transition there is an
extra inﬂow to the market from the block of individuals who entered the
production location together and leave it gradually, as they ﬁnd production
opportunities. The population in the market therefore converges on γ/(β+γ)
from below.
Let w(t) represent instantaneous ﬂow welfare at date t during transition.
If the ban occurs at time 0, it will be welfare improving if w(0) ≥ rW and
w0(.) is positive. When the ban is implemented, all the individuals with c ≥ ˆ c
(the ex-middlemen) leave the market. Those who remain in the market are







where N(0) is the market population immediately after the ban. Clearly,
N(0) = α ˆ N so w(0) = rW. As time passes, the ex-middlemen begin to
re-enter the market as producers. As this process leaves those who were
already producers unaﬀected, their contribution to ﬂow welfare remains con-
stant. The ex-middlemen contribute an increasing amount to welfare as their
18Although an explicit notion of equilibrium under a ban on middlemen has not been
deﬁned, as no decisions are being made, it should be clear that behavior simply involves
individuals producing searching and swapping goods.
24number in the market increases overtime. So, at every point in the transition,
ﬂo ww e l f a r ee x c e e d st h a to ft h elaissez-faire equilibrium.
When production takes time, middlemen remaining in the market means
they, increase the total number of market interactions that take place. They
do not, however, improve welfare because the matching rate for productive
people is unaﬀected by the number of middlemen.
4.2 Increasing returns to scale, β
0(N) > 0
Here we investigate the possibility that if matching becomes more eﬃcient
when there are more people in the market, the existence of middlemen can
be welfare enhancing.
Proposition 5 There exists a market equilibrium under increasing returns
to scale in the market meeting technology.
Proof. Equations (17), (18) are a non-linear system in {ˆ c,N} on [0,u]×[0,1].
The graph of equation (18) is monotonically decreasing from (1,γ/(β + γ))
to (0,1). As β(.) is continuous, a direct application of the implicit function
theorem is that the value of ˆ c as implied by (17) is continuous in N.A sN
only enters (17) through its eﬀect on β, we know from the previous discussion
on comparative statics under crs that the implied domain of ˆ c is [0,1].
The result then follows from the intermediate-value theorem for values of N
between γ/(β + γ) and 1.
This result says nothing about uniqueness. Although multiple steady-
state equilibria have not been ruled out, none have been found.






(u − c) dF(c).







(u − c) dF(c).
Here Nn is the number of people in the market when there are no middlemen.





In any equilibrium where ˆ c<¯ c, N > Nn.
To evaluate the possible beneﬁts of the laissez-faire economy over a ban
on intermediation, it is necessary to consider the transition. During the
transition to the no-middlemen steady-state, after the initial consumption of
inventories, present value of welfare will track from W to Wn.
We know from the comparative statics in β in the crs case that there
exists some minimum value, ˆ c0, of ˆ c that does not depend on N nor the
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(u − c) dF(c) >W
n
In this case, welfare immediately after the banned middlemen consume their
inventories must be strictly less than W. The diﬀerence will be increasing
in the diﬀerence between β(N) and β(Nn).The welfare beneﬁto fi n v e n t o r y
consumption is given by









(u − c) dF(c).
So long as the functional form for β makes β(N) − β(Nn) large enough, a
b a no ni n t e r m e d i a t i o nw i l ln o tb ew e l f a r ee n h a n c i n g .
26In this context,then, middleman activities can be beneﬁcial to society.
Individuals would, of course, prefer to avoid trading with them if possible.
This provides a new, market based justiﬁcation for the existence of middle-
men. They have no special skills and their matching opportunities are the
same as for anyone else in the economy but by remaining in the market, they
increase the eﬃciency of the meeting technology.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has analyzed a simple variant of the Diamond [1982] model. By
adding divisibility of goods and ex ante heterogeneity in productive abilities,
it has shown that middlemen can spontaneously emerge to take advantage
of market frictions. They trade on the basis of specialization and yet, in the
baseline economy, their activities are welfare reducing. As such the model
provides a simple example of a large economy in which some individuals
should be prohibited from acting in their own (private) best interests.
As market frictions diminish, the number of middlemen increases. This
runs contrary to the popular belief that the internet will ring the death knell
for market intermediaries. The reason it happens is that as trading oppor-
tunities get more frequent, middlemen see a faster return on their inventory
investment. The emergence of intermediaries therefore increases with the
economy’s ability to support them.
If we allow for time taken in production and increasing returns to scale
in the market meeting technology, middlemen have been shown to be poten-
tially beneﬁcial to society. Moreover, the way in which they contribute, by
increasing the eﬀectiveness of the meeting technology, is novel to this paper.
The paper also provides an example of commodity money in which the
27carrier could obtain as much utility from its consumption as he obtains from
the good he intends to buy with it. This happens because the possession of
an intact good that he can consume strengthens the middleman’s bargaining
power in subsequent meetings.
In principle, it is possible to write down a model that incorporates all
the forms of intermediary that have been documented in the literature and
calibrate it to a particular industry. While this might resolve the empirical
issue as to which role is most important, such a model would provide little by
way of insight as to the wider implications of each role. The point of the paper
has been to highlight the simplicity of the change to the familiar Diamond
e n v i r o n m e n tt h a tc r e a t e st h ei n c e n t i v efor individuals to avoid producing and
assess the implications of such activities for social welfare.
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